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AFTER PARTITION: THE PERILS OF SOUTH
SUDAN
Dr. Mario Silva
I.

INTRODUCTION

The partition of South Sudan from the largest country on the
African continent – Sudan, took place on July 9, 2011.1 The northern
portion retained the name Sudan while the newly formed southern state
would be known as South Sudan. South Sudan became the newest
member of the United Nations (UN) with comparatively little
infrastructure and limited arrangements for shared sovereignty by the
international community.2 The partition process was undertaken with
oversight from the United Nations and the African Union.3 It was
rather idealistically considered a prelude to an enduring peace within
this traditionally troubled African region. The former unitary state of
Sudan had been plagued by bitter internecine conflict for more than
half a century, and as a result, an estimated 2.5 million people lost their
lives and over five million were internally displaced.4
Prior to partition, a referendum in the southern region of the then
unitary Sudanese state took place in January 2011.5 Support for
secession from the Sudanese state was over 98%.6 The actual partition
process had moved forward with relatively little violence, and every
1.
2.
3.

4.

5.
6.

U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND NOTE ON SOUTH
SUDAN, Sept. 22, 2011, http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/southsudan/178466.htm.
U.N. Member States, http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml#s (providing that
South Sudan was admitted as a New Member State on July 14, 2011).
Press Release, Security Council, United Nations-African Union Joint Task Force on
Peace and Security, U.N. Press Release AFR/ 2254 (Sept. 26, 2011)
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/afr2254.doc.htm.
Kingsley Ighobor, Uprooting the Causes of Conflict, AFRICA RENEWAL MAG. (Aug.
2013) http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-2013/uprooting-causesconflicts.
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 1.
Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Extends Mandate of Mission in
Sudan Until 9 July 2011, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1978 (2011), U.N. Press
Release SC/ 10233 (April 27, 2011)
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10233.doc.htm.
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reasonable hope existed to expect a peaceful coexistence between
Sudan and the new state of South Sudan. However, disputes as well
as interethnic differences have once again resulted in fighting, and
fears of a protracted internal and external conflict in South Sudan have
re-emerged. Accompanying this resurgent conflict is the fear that
another humanitarian crisis could occur in the region as food shortages
in the South now threaten millions of people once again.
Fault for the fact that partition has failed to bring peace to the
region is increasingly being assigned to undue haste and lack of
international supervision. South Sudan, it would seem in retrospect,
was permitted to secede without the establishment of mechanisms to
resolve internal and external disputes. Moreover, during the transition
to independence, all power was assigned to an interim government
instead of a coalition of interests, which occurred without a United
Nations trusteeship arrangement.7
The transfer of control by failed states to the United Nations
requires considerable debate and a clear consensus among UN member
states, so as to prevent equating transferral of control with any form of
colonial takeover.8 The authority of the International Trusteeship
System and the terms for administration and designation of authority
is outlined under Chapter XII of the UN Charter.9 The notion of
sovereign equality was unquestionably important to the architecture of
the Charter following the devastation of the Second World War;10
however, at the time of signing there were only fifty-one member
states, and by 2011 South Sudan became the 193rd member state.11
As the crisis in South Sudan worsens, with mounting evidence of
gross violations of international human rights law and internal strife, it
is important to critically analyze the reasons for the failure of the
partition to bring about peace, and to review solutions the international
community might implement to realize peaceful co-existence between
the two “Sudans.”

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

United Nations-African Union Joint Task Force on Peace and Security, supra note 3.
U.N. Charter art. 77-85.
Id.
U.N. Charter art. 77.
U.N. Member States, supra note 2.
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The United Nations peacekeeping Mission in the Republic of
South Sudan (UNMISS) was authorized by the Security Council in
December 2013 to double its armed strength to nearly 14,000 in an
effort to protect civilians.12 However, its mandate is not adequate to
deal with the challenges.
The power struggle between President Salva Kiir Mayardit and
the former Vice President Riek Machar has made the challenge of state
reconstruction an impossible task. The current efforts by the East
African regional bloc, the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD), to find a peaceful solution will not lead to long
term stability as there is no political will by IGAD, nor the international
community for long-term state-building efforts.
If there is hope that a failed state such as South Sudan can be
rescued from this situation, efforts to do so will require more
international assistance and the pursuit for comprehensive approaches,
which entails putting the country under a UN mandate, pending such
time when it would be capable of successfully and efficiently running
its affairs.
A. Background
South Sudan’s history is characterized by tribal migrations from
the Nile region and also from within Central Africa.13 The people of
South Sudan have resisted outsiders, including the French and
Belgians, as well as the spread of Islam to the south.14 By 1821 the
name Sudan, borrowed from an Arab term meaning “Land of the
Blacks,” led to the beginning of an emergent political entity.15 The
British eventually expanded their influence to the south in the late

12.

13.

14.
15.

Press Release, Security Council, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2132 (2013),
Security Council Increases United Nations Mission’s Military Presence in South
Sudan, U.N. Press Release SC/ 11230 (Dec. 24, 2013)
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc11230.doc.htm.
See P. M. HOLT & M. W. DALY, A HISTORY OF THE SUDAN: FROM THE COMING OF
ISLAM TO THE PRESENT DAY 1, 3 (Pearson Educ. Ltd., 5th ed. 2000) (The Arabic term
used was “Bilad al Sudan,” “Land of the Blacks”).
Id.
Holt & Daly, supra note 13 at 3.
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nineteenth century, and included Sudan.16 For all practical purposes,
Britain ruled Sudan until 1956, even though officially, by virtue of an
1899 agreement, the country was to be jointly administered by Egypt
and Britain.17 In reality, London chose which officials would
administer Sudan, and Egypt remained very much a junior partner.18
In 1947, British hopes to join South Sudan with Uganda were
dashed by the Juba Conference, which aimed to unify North and South
Sudan.19 The realities of Britain’s post-war status meant that it was not
well positioned to resist political change, and consequently in 1953,
elections were conducted and Ismail al-Azhari became the country’s
first prime minister.20 The British and the Egyptians departed Sudan
on January 1, 1956, which was the day that Sudan became formally
independent.21 However, prior to the official proclamation of
independence, rebellion had broken out in the southern part of Sudan.22
In actuality, the concept of a united Sudan was a colonial creation, and
with Britain’s departure it was almost inevitable that conflict would
follow. This familiar fault line, characterized by the Arab north versus
the African south, held deep and enduring animosity.
The divergent nature of the southern and northern regions is
illuminated in the partitioned state, where South Sudan has a
population of over 8 million and a predominantly rural, subsistence
economy.23 Today, South Sudan struggles to cope with the effects of
conflict, displacement, and insecurity. The country has many tribal
groups and languages, and its people practice traditional, indigenous
beliefs, irrespective of the fact that over 90% of the population identify
themselves as Christian.24

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id. at 102, 104.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 102, 104.
Id.
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 1.
Id.
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II.

CIVIL WAR

The conflict between the North and South has endured principally
as a result of a long-held tendency by successive governments in
Khartoum to view the difficulties with the South as issues best resolved
militarily. Initial promises by northern political leaders to establish a
federal state structure and uphold secularism were not honored. The
provisional constitution adopted at the time of independence was silent
on fundamental issues for southern leaders, such as “the secular or
Islamic character of the state and its federal or unitary structure.”25 The
agreement, implied or statutory, with respect to how the newly
independent Sudan would function was quickly disregarded by the
Arab-led Khartoum government, which resulted in a long civil conflict
lasting from 1955 until 1972.
In the early years of Sudanese independence, a military coup lead
by General Ibrahim Abboud overthrew the elected government and
suspended democracy. General Abboud pursued a policy of
“Arabization and Islamisation throughout the Sudan that strengthened
southern opposition.”26 In 1964, General Abboud was overthrown and
replaced with a civilian caretaker government. At the time southern
leaders were divided into two factions: those who wanted a federal
solution and those who advocated independence.27
An opportunity for reconciliation occurred when the southern
rebels signed an agreement in Addis Ababa in 1972, establishing a
measure of autonomy for the South.28 However, this development did
not endure for long, and its demise was hastened when international
oil companies discovered substantial oil reserves in the South in the
late 1970s.29 In 1983, President Nimeiri abrogated the peace treaty by
revising Sudan’s civil laws to establish conformity with Sharia, or
Islamic Law, and in so doing ignited the second Sudan civil war.30
When the second civil war commenced, the government in
Khartoum clearly had every intention of exploiting the South’s natural
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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resources.31 A military coup led by General Omar al Bashir took place,
and upon his assumption of power, he banned all political parties. The
authoritarian regime supported radical Islamist groups, including
providing a training base to terrorist organizations such as Osama Bin
Laden’s al Qaida.32
The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) managed to survive
the chaos of the 1990s and remained the principal party participating
in negotiations between the North and the South. In 1997, the
Khartoum government had agreed to permit a referendum in the South
to determine whether the people there desired independence, or a
continued unified state with the North. Irrespective of this, it took
another eight years to end the fighting when the SPLA and the al Bashir
government signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on
January 9, 2005, in Nairobi, Kenya.33
This milestone agreement established a ceasefire, regional and
national elections, resettlement of internally displaced persons,
withdrawal of troops from South Sudan, and a free referendum to
determine the status of South Sudan.34 Under the power sharing
agreement, Colonel John Garang was named Vice President and Omar
al Bashir retained the presidency. Seven months later, Colonel Garang
died in a helicopter crash. The man who would eventually become
South Sudan’s first President, Salva Kiir Mayardit, took over after Col.
Garang’s untimely death.

31.
32.

33.

34.

U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 1.
Id.; see also Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, State Dep’t, Country
Reports on Terrorism (2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/170479.pdf (Released on Aug. 18, 2011,
the U.S. Department of State’s annual terrorism assessment concluded that terrorist
groups, including “Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorists, remain in Sudan as gaps remained in
the Sudanese government’s knowledge of and ability to identify and capture these
individuals as well as prevent them from exploiting the territory for smuggling
activities.”).
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, The Government of the Republic of Sudan –
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, July 20,
2002, available at
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_060000_The%20Compreh
ensive%20Peace%20Agreement.pdf.
Id.
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A. Referendum and State Formation
Consistent with the terms of the 2005 peace accord, a referendum
was conducted from January 9-15, 2011, to determine if South Sudan
should declare its independence from Sudan.35 The official results
were released on January 30, 2011, indicating that 98.83% of the
population supported independence.36 This led to the formal
declaration of independence by the Republic of South Sudan on July
9, 2011.37 The newly independent state was quickly recognized as the
newest member of the United Nations.38 The Security Council adopted
Resolution 1996 and established a Mission in the Republic of South
Sudan (UNMISS) to consolidate peace and to assist in nurturing
condition for development.39 Resolution 1996 emphasized the
importance of partnerships and consultation, as well as encouraging
the new South Sudanese government to ratify international human
rights treaties.40
The transitional constitution, ratified by the South Sudan
assembly just prior to independence, provided a legal framework for
the new nation state.41 The constitution establishes a mixed
presidential system of government, headed by a president who is head
of state, head of government, and commander-in-chief of the armed
forces.42 It also establishes the National Legislature comprising of two
houses: a directly elected assembly, the National Legislative
Assembly; and a second chamber of representatives of the states, the

35.
36.
37.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Security Council Extends Mandate of Mission in Sudan Until 9 July 2011,
Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1978 (2011), supra note 6.
Security Council Extends Mandate of Mission in Sudan Until 9 July 2011,
Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1978 (2011), supra note 6.
Press Release, Security Council, ‘Like Any Newborn, South Sudan Needs Help,’
Secretary-General Says, Moments After Security Council Recommends Country’s
Admission to United Nations, U.N. Press Release SC/10323 (July 13, 2011).
U.N. Member States, supra note 2.
‘Like Any Newborn,’ supra note 37.
S.C. Res. 1996, U.N. Doc. S/RES 1996 (July 8, 2011)
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1996(2011).
THE TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN, July 9, 2011,
available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=250715.
Id.
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Council of States.43 The constitution also provides for an independent
judiciary, the highest level being the Supreme Court.44
The referendum unfortunately left several contentious issues
unresolved. One issue was the future of the Abyei region where a
simultaneous referendum was supposed to be held; however, it was
postponed due to disputes over demarcation lines and residency rights.
The ensuing clashes in Abyei eventually led the Sudanese President,
Omar al-Bashir, and the President of the autonomous Government of
Southern Sudan, to agree in 2008 to have the boundary issue arbitrated
by the Permanent Court of Arbitration.45 In 2009 the Abyei’s
boundaries were redefined when the Tribunal of the Permanent Court
of Arbitration ruled that:
The eastern boundary of the Abyei Area runs along
longitude 29°00’00”E, from latitude 10°10’00”N south to the
Kordofan – Upper Nile boundary as it was defined on 1
January 1956. Moreover, the Tribunal rules that the western
boundary of the Abyei Area runs along longitude
27°50’00”E, from latitude 10°10’00”N south to the Kordofan
– Darfur boundary as it was defined on 1 January 1956. The
western boundary of Abyei Area then follows the DarfurKordofan boundary until it meets the southern boundary of
the Abyei Area.46
The Tribunal decision was based on scholarly, documentary,
cartographic, and oral evidence submitted by the parties.47 The parties
have yet to respect the decision and tensions remain high. The final
status of the Abyei region remains unresolved even after the October
2013 non-binding referendum, which overwhelmingly supported

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 1.
Id.
Gov’t of Sudan v. Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army (“Abyei Arbitration”)
(Arb. Trib. July 22, 2009), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=1240.
Id.
Id.
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joining South Sudan.48 The referendum was proposed by the African
Union.49 The other conflict area is South Kordofan, where fighting had
broken out in June 2011 between Sudan and the SPLA over the
ownership of the Nuba Mountains. Once again, in July 2012, fighting
continued in the region including involvement from Darfur region
insurgents.
Although Sudan was the first country to recognize South Sudan’s
independence, relations have certainly not developed along friendly
lines. The biggest remaining problem is the sharing of oil revenues.
An estimated 80% of oil production of undivided Sudan came from the
south and Sudan now wants an increased share of that revenue. Once
again, this was supposed to have been settled by the August 2, 2012
deadline; however, the nature of the negotiations and the tenor of
exchanges between the two governments makes achieving an
agreement by the set date unlikely.
III.

PARTITIONING CONFLICT OIL

The dispute over oil revenues stems from the fact that the
Sudanese government derived as much as 98% of its budgetary
revenues from the sale of almost half a million barrels of oil per day. 50
The creation of South Sudan deprived Khartoum of most of its oil. The
crux of the current problem is that South Sudan’s oil is exported
through two pipelines controlled by Sudan.51 These oil pipelines run
to refineries and export terminals at Port Sudan on the Red Sea.52 A
48.

49.
50.

51.

52.

Musaazi Namiti, Analysis: Struggle for power in South Sudan, AL JAZEERA, Dec. 21,
2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/12/analysis-struggle-powersouth-sudan-20131217845861691.html (explaining that he Dinka people with close
ties to South Sudan participated in the vote but not the Arab Misseriya).
Id.
South Sudan: An Infrastructure Action Plan, AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP
(2013), http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/GenericDocuments/South%20Sudan%20Infrastructure%20Action%20Plan%20%20%20A%20Program%20for%20Sustained%20Strong%20Economic%20Growth%
20-%20Full%20Report.pdf.
South Sudan: Economy, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/countrytemplate_od.html.
Id.
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2005 oil-sharing agreement with Khartoum called for an even share of
oil revenues between the two entities, but that arrangement concluded
when South Sudan became an independent state.53 As South Sudan
resisted paying huge fees to Khartoum for oil transportation, it suffered
blockades imposed on its goods and capital.54
According to Luka Biong Deng, a former minister of the national
government of Sudan and a senior member of the Sudanese People’s
Liberation Movement, the two states depend so heavily upon oil
revenues that differences over revenue sharing after secession have
triggered intensely antagonistic feelings.55 Deng noted:
It would have been simple arrangements after secession
that the South to manage its own oil and pay internationally
accepted fees for the use of oil infrastructure in the Sudan.
However, after the secession of the South, Sudan puts very a
high bill to be covered by the South not only for the use of its
pipelines (USD36 per barrel) but also to meet the budget
deficit (USD10 billion) caused by the secession of the
South.56
In January 2012, South Sudan shut down all oil production due to
the dispute over the high fees demanded by Khartoum for transporting
its oil.57 The decision surprised the world community and exposed
Khartoum and Juba’s political and economic fragility. The decision
has led to fighting along the border, as access to the oil is viewed as a
matter of survival for Sudan.58 According to a former U.S. envoy to

53.

54.
55.

56.
57.
58.

South Sudan: Economy, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/countrytemplate_od.html.
Id.
Luka Boing Deng, Sudan and South Sudan: Where are they heading?, SUDAN TRIB.,
May 11, 2012,
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=42561.
Id.
South Sudan: Economy, supra note 51.
United Nations Mission In Sudan: Fleeing Conflict in Abyei, UNMIS PUBLIC
INFORMATION OFFICE (June 2011),
http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/2011Docs/inSUDAN-June-2011-engweb.pdf.
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Sudan, the country demanded $36 a barrel to transport the oil to Port
Sudan, while the going international rate is less than $1.59
In May, Sudan seized control of the Abyei region, a disputed oilrich territory.60 Heavy shelling, aerial bombardment, and numerous
tank assaults accompanied the northern advance.61 South Sudan
declared this to be an act of war, and the United Nations was compelled
to send an envoy to Khartoum to intervene.62 Abyei at one time
produced more than one-fourth of Sudan’s oil, and Sudan’s Greater
Nile Oil Pipeline runs through this region, which is claimed by both
the states.63 Even though Abyei’s oil supplies are currently running
low, some experts believe that untapped oil reserves still remain buried
in the region.
Since its discovery, revenues from oil have represented more than
90% of foreign exchange earnings for the government,64 and after
succession the issue has emerged as a matter of political and economic
survival for the government of Khartoum.
IV.

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

Relations between the two states sharply deteriorated in 2012.
Fighting began in March 2012 when South Sudanese forces seized the
Heglig oil fields in lands claimed by both Sudan and South Sudan in
the province of South Kordofan.65 The Sudanese Air Force bombed
the South Sudan Unity oilfields, and the Sudanese Army later attacked
the disputed areas of Jau, Pan Akuach, and Teshwin. The South
Sudanese People’s Liberation Army reportedly repulsed most of these
attacks.

59.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Andrew S. Natsios, To Stop the War on South Sudan, the U.S. Should Send Weapons,
WASH. POST, May 12, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/to-stop-thewar-on-south-sudan-the-us-should-sendweapons/2012/05/11/gIQAywIkIU_story.html.
United Nations Mission In Sudan: Fleeing Conflict in Abyei, supra note 58.
United Nations Mission In Sudan: Fleeing Conflict in Abyei, supra note 58.
United Nations Mission In Sudan: Fleeing Conflict in Abyei, supra note 58.
United Nations Mission In Sudan: Fleeing Conflict in Abyei, supra note 58.
Deng, supra note 55.
UN Says South Sudan Seized Oil Field Illegally, BBC NEWS AFRICA (Apr. 19, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17780226.
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This military conflict has led to the intensification of nationalistic
feelings in both Sudanese states. In April, the Sudanese parliament
passed a unanimous resolution declaring the government of Southern
Sudan to be an “enemy.”66 This move came days after Southern
Sudanese troops took control of Sudan’s oil-rich area of Heglig on the
border.67 The South Sudanese forces had temporarily seized the
North’s main Heglig oilfield for ten days in April, but were reported to
have pushed back by military means. The current round of fighting is
the most serious to have taken place since the South’s independence
last July, and it has raised fears of a more widespread war. The
international community is working diligently to push Sudan and
South Sudan back to the negotiating table after talks were suspended
in spring 2012.68
The UN Security Council was forced to intervene in early May
2012, and demanded that Sudan withdraw its forces from Abyei.69
Khartoum responded by indicating that it would only do so after a joint
military observer group was created for the area.70 The latest round of
clashes broke out on May 9, 2012, with South Sudan accusing Sudan
of bombing southern border states in the Upper Nile, Unity, and
Western Bahr el-Ghazal regions. The United Nations Security Council
passed a resolution on May 2, 2012, threatening sanctions if the two
sides did not follow an African Union roadmap stipulating a cease-fire
and a return to talks within two weeks.71
Several news reports in the early summer of 2012 suggested a
hardening of attitudes in Khartoum.72 The Albawaba News Service
reported that the Sudanese president Omar al Bashir declared there
66.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

72.

South Sudan Declared “Enemy” by Sudan Parliament, ALBAWABA NEWS (Apr. 16,
2012), http://www.albawaba.com/main-headlines/south-sudan-declared-enemy-sudanparliament-421176.
UN Says South Sudan Seized Oil Field Illegally, supra note 65.
S.C. Res. 2046, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (May 2, 2012).
Id.
Sudan Rejects Calls for Negotiations with South, ALBAWABA NEWS, Apr. 24, 2012,
http://www.albawaba.com/news/sudan-rejects-calls-negotiations-south-422153.
Kremena Krumova, Sudan Intensifies Crackdown on Media: South Sudan Follows
Suit, THE EPOCH TIMES, May 18, 2012,
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/world/sudan-intensifies-crackdown-on-media239115.html.
See generally Sudan Rejects Calls for Negotiations with South, supra note 70.
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would be no negotiations with South Sudan, “With them, we are
negotiating with guns and bullets.”73
Both governments spent the spring of 2012 accusing each other of
supporting rebels in their respective territories.74 Khartoum has
asserted that the Government of South Sudan supports rebels of the
Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North (SPLA-N), operating in
Khordofan and South Blue Nile.75 Sudanese forces are alleged to have
reacted with a brutal crackdown on rebels and their sympathizers.76
The governor of South Khordofan in Sudan, Ahmed Harun,
recently gave instructions to the Sudanese armed forces “clearly
suggesting that they should not take prisoners.”77 Harun is one of three
Sudanese men, including President Omar al-Bashir, who are the
subject of arrest warrants by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for
war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur.78 Despite
international pressure on the government of Sudan to surrender him to
the ICC, Harun served as Sudan’s Minister of State for Humanitarian
Affairs until May 2009, when he was appointed to the governorship of
South Kordofan.79 The Sudanese government has refused to surrender
Harun to the ICC, arguing that the court has no jurisdiction over the
case and that the possible crimes were a matter for the Sudanese
judicial system.
Another major issue of concern is the expulsion of South
Sudanese from Sudan, following partition.80 Khartoum has threatened
and issued an ultimatum to an estimated 500,000 ethnic South
Sudanese to leave or join Sudan by filing the required residency

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Sudan Rejects Calls for Negotiations with South, supra note 70.
Sudan Rejects Calls for Negotiations with South, supra note 70.
South Sudan Declared “Enemy” by Sudan Parliament, supra note 66.
Krumova, supra note 71.
South Sudan Declared “Enemy” by Sudan Parliament, supra note 66.
South Sudan Declared “Enemy” by Sudan Parliament, supra note 66.
South Sudan Declared “Enemy” by Sudan Parliament, supra note 66.
South Sudan ‘Bombing’ Despite UN Sanctions Deadline, BBC NEWS, May 4, 2012,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17954805.
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paperwork.81 Official estimates note that 350,000 South Sudanese
remain in several refugee camps in Sudan.82
The fighting and economic challenges have led to acute food
scarcity in South Sudan.83 The United Nations has called for
emergency assistance for the millions of Southern Sudanese who are
facing unparalleled levels of food insecurity.84 The World Food
Program estimates that about “4.7 million people in South Sudan are
in need of food assistance, with an estimated 1 million people set to
suffer from food insecurity in 2012, and another 3.7 million people
likely to face significant vulnerabilities to food insecurity.”85 Of the
estimated 9 million people, half are currently under the age of eighteen
and yet, the country suffers from high unemployment, infant mortality,
and substantial rates of literacy.86 According to UNICEF, “70 percent
of children between six and seventeen years of age have never been to
school.”87
V.

INSTABILITY AND INTERNAL CONFLICT

No less critical than its external conflict with Sudan is South
Sudan’s myriad of domestic challenges. The basic problem stems
from the disparate tribal societies that constitute South Sudan’s
population. It is estimated that the country is comprised of more than
sixty distinct cultural and linguistic groups, each of which have strong
tribal loyalties.88 Rebels opposed to the SPLA-dominated South Sudan
81.
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government accuse the administration of plotting to retain power
indefinitely and maintain that the regime is not fairly representing all
tribal groups.89
These tribal groups were united in their opposition to the North
and their struggle for self-determination.90 However, in the postsecessionist state, this key element has been removed with no other
unifying issue to fill the gap. The latest member of the UN has found
itself with an unclear sense of nationhood, “making its viability as a
nation a matter of speculation.”91
Inter-ethnic clashes have been endemic to South Sudan for many
years now. Jonglei is the largest of the ten states in South Sudan.92 In
2009, conflict erupted, killing more than 2,000 people and displacing
approximately 250,000 others.93 In December 2011, tribal clashes in
Jonglei intensified between the Nuer White Army of the Lou Nuer and
the Murle. The White Army warned that it would wipe out the Murle
and fight the South Sudanese and UN forces sent to the area around
Pibor.
Six months after succession, there were deadly clashes between
the Lou Nuer and Murle communities, which led to the displacement
of thousands of civilians.94 Hilde Johnson, the Secretary-General’s
Special Representative and head of the UN Mission in South Sudan
(UNMISS), expressed deep concern about the killings at press
conference on January 19, 2012.95 Hate messages were delivered by
some individuals and groups, which she said could incite systematic
ethnic violence.96
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Presently, as many as nine of South Sudan’s ten provinces are
reported to be embroiled in violence caused by local militias and armed
ethnic groups. In many places, euphoria about independence has been
replaced by despondence. While the war with Khartoum is worrying
the people of the new nation, it is the internal conflicts that are a
seemingly more pressing threat. Thus, greater increased attention to
the issue is needed. Contrary to those in the West, who would argue
in support of further arms for South Sudan to curtail acts of aggression
by Khartoum, a recent statement published by Amnesty International
accuses the U.S., Russia and China of fuelling violations in the Sudan
conflict through the arms trade.97
In late December 2013, the Security Council held a series of crisis
meetings on South Sudan, and demanded immediate cessation of
hostilities following a report by UNMISS. The report provided
“mounting evidence of gross human rights abSes in the strife-torn
country, including, extra-judicial killings of civilians and captured
soldiers, massive displacements and arbitrary detentions, often on
ethnic grounds.”98
The situation was a result of a coup d’état on December 14, 2013
by the former Vice President Riek Machar, who was dismissed in July
2013. President Kiir belongs to the Dinka ethnic group and Machar to
the Lou Nuer. There is mounting evidence of ethnic targeting of South
Sudanese citizens.
VI.

CONFLICT PREVENTION AND STATE BUILDING

The euphoria generated by the independence of South Sudan has
quickly dissipated, raising serious doubts as to the future viability of
the new nation, and many speculate on the wisdom of the potentially
unrealistic and rushed acceptance by the United Nation of its latest
member. As far back as 2005, when the Comprehensive Peace
97.
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Agreement (CPA) was signed, the international community
optimistically, or naively, assumed that this would lead to peace and
stability in the region.99 Some supporters of South Sudan assume that
the situation can be repaired if only Sudan could be restrained
militarily. Andrew S. Natsios, George W. Bush’s former envoy to
Sudan and a professor at Georgetown University, suggests that the
solution lies in arming South Sudan:
Its war with the North is the result of an imbalance of
military power that has encouraged military adventurism.
Omar al-Bashir, President of the North and a possible coup
target, believes he can secure his future by bombing the South
into submission instead of negotiating. . . The only way to
end the North’s bullying and foster peace talks is to give the
South the right tools: American anti-aircraft weapons. If the
United States provides the materiel [sic], the South can end
the North’s bombing campaign.100
However, as noted above, both Khartoum and Juba are already
receiving arms from various states. Unfortunately, acts of aggression
by Sudan are not the only problem with which South Sudan must
contend. The inability of South Sudan’s President, Salva Kiir, to
address the grievances of the smaller tribes and ethnic groups is a
significant problem that war with the North cannot gloss over. In his
Independence Day speech, President Kiir had promised “transparency
and open government” as the main priorities for the new nation.
However, the opposition in South Sudan claims that the President has
not kept his word and is not open to transparency in government.
State building essentially assumes that a modern state has a certain
set of obligations that must be met, such as respect for the rule of law,
accountability, security, and welfare. State building can also involve
the construction of basic infrastructure, such as roads for ease of
transportation. This is an important endeavour, given that, as has
been demonstrated by several scholars with respect to Africa, the

99. Deng, supra note 55.
100. Natsios, supra Note 59.
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“government’s inability to broadcast power into peripheral regions
of state territory lies at the heart of state failure and collapse.” 101
Reconstruction and state building are daunting tasks even in
the most opportune circumstances. Furthermore, it may not always
be possible to have an overarching authority that can guarantee
security, and therefore it has been suggested that a new
mechanism, created and supported by the international
community, needs to take root. State formation in South Sudan
has not effectively occurred.
VII.

ROLE OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL

The UN Security Council has adopted a series of resolutions
dealing with the conflict in Sudan, including the unanimously adopted
Resolution 1556 on July 30, 2004, regarding the humanitarian crisis in
Darfur.102 However, more pertinent to the issue of South Sudan, was
the adoption on November 19, 2004, of Security Council Resolution
1574, which provided support for the implementation of a
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005.103 The resolution
was adopted at a meeting in Nairobi, Kenya, and was only the fourth
meeting held outside its New York City headquarters since 1952.
Since the milestone Resolution 1574, and the involvement in several
peace initiatives in Sudan, UN participation in the creation of the
Republic of South Sudan has been critical.104
The legal framework was established with the Referendum Act,
and the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission (SSRC) was formed
at the national level. The Security Council has also unanimously
adopted Resolution 1674 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed
Conflict, which contains the first official reference to the
Responsibility to Protect. This resolution was cited when Resolution
1996 was adopted on the eve of the birth of the Republic of South
Sudan, when the Security Council welcomed the new state and
101. Jens Meierhenrich, Forming States after Failure, in WHEN STATES FAIL: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES 162, (Robert I. Rotbery ed., 2004).
102. S.C. Res. 1556, U.N. Doc. S/RES 1556 (July 30, 2004).
103. S.C. Res. 1574, U.N. Doc. S/RES 1574 (Nov. 19, 2004).
104. See id.
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reaffirmed its strong commitment to the “sovereignty, independence,
territorial integrity, and national unity of the Republic of South
Sudan.”105 It also noted that, “national ownership and national
responsibility are key to establishing sustainable peace and the primary
responsibility of national authorities in identifying their priorities and
strategies for post-conflict peace building.”106
Yet the same motion also deplored the security situation in the
region and emphasized the need for clarity regarding the “roles,
responsibilities, and collaboration between UNMISS and the UN
Country Team.” The Security Council further determined under
Chapter VII that the situation in South Sudan “continues to constitute
a threat to international peace and security in the region.” A UN
mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was supposed to
operate for one year; however, on July 5, 2012, Resolution 2057 was
passed which extended the mission for another twelve months.107
UNMISS’ mission from the beginning has always been to
establish the conditions to strengthen the capacity of the Government
of South Sudan, as well as assist and advise on the fulfilment of its
responsibility to comply with international humanitarian and human
rights law.
In April 2013, five Indian UNMISS troops and several civilians
were killed in a rebel ambush in Jonglei. UN Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon called the killings a war crime.108 The crisis intensified with
further mass violation of human rights, ethnic targeting, and an
attempted military coup, which, on December 24, 2013, resulted in
Security Council authorization to double the number of existing troops.
Since its inception, South Sudan has demonstrated that inadequate
resolutions by the Security Council will not lead to reconstruction and
stability of the latest member of the UN, and confirm the need for a
more robust trusteeship arrangement.
105. S.C. Res. 1996, U.N. Doc. S/RES 1996 (July 8, 2011),
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1996(2011).
106. S.C. Res. 1996, U.N. Doc. S/RES 1996 (July 8, 2011).
107. Security Council Extends UN Mission in South Sudan for Another Year, UN NEWS
CENTRE (July 5, 2012),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42406#.U_eM40srdg0.
108. Attack on Peacekeepers a War Crime: Ban Ki-moon, THE HINDU, Apr. 11, 2013,
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/attack-on-peacekeepers-a-war-crimeban-kimoon/article4599333.ece.
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LIMITED TRUSTEESHIP

The question of South Sudan transferring control to a United
Nations Trusteeship Council requires considerable debate. The issue
of state sovereignty and self-determination remain, as in the times of
the mandate system, legal challenges to prospective trusteeships.
Trusteeship today, is both complicated and highly political. Under the
United Nations Trusteeship System, no member can be put under
trusteeship due to the international legal principle of state sovereignty.
However, both the Security Council and the International Court of
Justice have shown flexibility in their interpretation of the Charter.
The Security Council could authorize some form of shared sovereignty
to assist a failing state.
The United Nations Charter must set out specific conventions if it
is ever to move forward toward some form of shared sovereignty in the
wake of state failure. A partnership needs to be encouraged between
the United Nations and the Member State, and trust needs to be
developed at the local level to avoid any resentment among the local
population. Articles 75-91 of Chapter XII of the United Nations
Charter outline the authority of International Trusteeship System.109
Under Article 75, for example, “The United Nations shall establish
under its authority an international trusteeship system for the
administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed
there under by subsequent individual agreements. These territories are
hereinafter referred to as trust territories.”110
On the question of failed states becoming part of a trusteeship, the
Secretary-General replied that this is something the United Nations
Member States will have to discuss.111 The United Nations Charter
precludes the kind of trusteeship indicated above, as the International
Trusteeship System applies only to former League mandates,
territories captured during the Second World War, and other areas
placed under trusteeship by their administering states. However, as
stated in Article 78, “[t]he trusteeship system shall not apply to
109. U.N. Charter art. 75-91.
110. U.N. Charter art. 75, para. 1.
111. Press Release, Secretary-General, Transcript of Press Conference by Security-General
Kofi Annan at U.N. Headquarters. U.N. Press Release SG/SM/8855 (Sept. 8, 2003).
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territories which have become Members of the United Nations”.112
This limitation reflects the colonial situation and the priorities of
Member States of the United Nations at the close of the Second World
War.
The creation of a trusteeship in 1945 over a Member State would
have been viewed as inconsistent with the premise that the United
Nations was to be based upon “the principle of the sovereign equality
of all Members,”113 and that it would not interfere with their internal
affairs. However, states could voluntarily relinquish control over their
internal and external affairs for a defined period of time. The
trusteeship plan could, however, go further with the United Nations, or
a group of states serving as the administering authority for South
Sudan.
Obtaining political consensus is a difficult undertaking at the
United Nations, and changing the Charter would be even more
challenging, as many states would assert that such an action would
undermine Article II, Section 1, or the “sovereign equality” provision.
However, as noted by scholars, most failed states hardly govern
themselves; thus the notion of sovereignty is changing. This would
necessitate developing clear criteria of responsibility, as well as the
power to commence and conclude.
The traditional fundamental principles of legitimacy of the
Westphalia system rest on the notion of state sovereignty, even a
recommendation that “states that cease to exercise formal control over
parts of their nominal territories should lose their sovereignty, that is,
be decertified”.114 This article shares the view that has been expressed
by some legal scholars that the Westphalian sovereignty model
“should never have been accorded to fragile post-colonial entities with
no history and experience of performing as or organizing a state”.115
The debate as to the best possible means of reconstructing a failed
state is an ongoing matter, and the proposal that sovereignty may be
112. U.N. Charter art. 78.
113. U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 1 (“The Organization is based on the principle of the
sovereign equality of all its Members.”).
114. Robert I. Rotberg, The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States. Breakdown, Prevention,
and Repair, in WHEN STATES FAIL CAUSE AND CONSEQUENCES 1, 41 (Robert I. Rotberg
ed., 2004).
115. Id. at 27.
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breached by outsiders in order to build the states can, for some, evoke
disturbing images of colonialism. However, as noted above, there is a
growing body of literature arguing, “international engagement must be
more robust”.116 Scholars have also suggested that “[w]ithout outside
intervention, the formation of a state after failure is likely to be in
vain.”117
An imposed solution for the reconstruction and rebuilding of
South Sudan is not the preferred option. There is need for an engaged
indigenous process in order for reconstruction to be successful, and to
be maintained once foreign assistance is withdrawn. Some scholars
have indicated that this is not always attainable, but have maintained
that “[a] certain degree of international control and imposition is
necessary in order to bring about a well-functioning state, in which the
ruling elite are accountable to the people.”118 In the context of failed
states, the need to reintroduce a formal trusteeship that can ensure both
accountability to agreements and delivery of vital service begs serious
debate.119
Given that there is no consensus to apply an overall supervisory
role similar to the mechanism in place during the Trusteeship Council,
a number of observers have noted that in lieu of a formal Trusteeship,
the international community has instead used ad hoc devices for the
international stewardship of peoples and territory, in what Ralph Wilde
has termed “international territorial administration.”120 These ad hoc
arrangements have the same basic objectives as were in place during
the Trusteeship Council, which were meant to impose order and help
territories in reconstruction. For example, in 1999 the United Nations
Security Council, in adopting resolutions 1272 (East Timor) and 1244
(Kosovo), and placing these territories under a temporary UN
administration, in essence reaffirmed the need to revive the
Trusteeship Council. In the case of East Timor, “the Competencies of

116. Louisa Andersen, Fragile States on the International Agenda, in FRAGILE SITUATIONS.
BACKGROUND PAPERS, DANISH INST. OF INT’L STUDIES REP. 15 (Mar. 2008).
117. Meierhenrich, supra note 101, at 162.
118. Andersen, supra note 116, at 15-16.
119. Id. at 16.
120. Ralph Wilde, From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International
Territorial Administration, 95 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 583, 585 (2001).
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the United Nations Transitional Administration included all the classic
powers of a state.”121
These unique circumstances present an opportunity, but also raise
questions in international law as to the optimal arrangements to deal
with the sovereignty deficit of these naissance states. In a recent oped on African Arguments, former Assistant Secretary of the United
States for Africa, Herman Cohen, noted the Security Council needs to
establish a trustee mandate, given that “the ruling Sudan People
Liberation Movement (SPLM) has no ability to govern the country
particularly given the lack of infrastructure, education, private
investment and institutions.”122
In many parts of the world state failure is rooted in weak state
capacity. The settlement negotiation of Namibia provides a good
example of a United Nations trusteeship that occurred in a period of
transition and led to its independence after several legal classifications
and compromises that were sui generis of the United Nations
operation.
The United Nations had a supervisory central objective, which
was to hold free and fair elections for a Constituent Assembly that
would draft a constitution leading to the independence of Namibia. 123
Some scholars have commented that the United Nations Trusteeship
System “is to some extent a victim of its own success.”124
Other notable scholars, such as Helman and Ratner, have argued
for a return of the trusteeship model as a solution to failing states and
recommend:
[D]irect U.N. trusteeship when there is a total breakdown
of governmental authority. . .the theoretical basis for
conservatorship in the domestic analogue of the polity
121. Carsten Stahn, The United Nations Transitional Administration in Kosovo and East
Timor: A First Analysis, 5 MAX PLANCK Y.B.U.N.L. 1, 115 (2001).
122. South Sudan Blasts Calls to Place Country Under UN Trusteeship, SUDAN TRIBUNE,
Jan. 22, 2014, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49681.
123. Hank Cohen, South Sudan Should be Placed Under UN Trusteeship to Aid
Development of Viable Self-Government, AFR. ARGUMENTS ONLINE, Jan. 6, 2014,
http://africanarguments.org/2014/01/06/south-sudan-should-be-placed-under-untrusteeship-to-aid-development-of-viable-self-government-by-hank-cohen/.
124. Nele Matz, Civilization and the Mandate System under the League of Nations as
Origin of Trusteeship, 9 U.N.Y.B. 47, 48 (2005).

87

UB Journal of International Law

Vol. III, No. I

helping those who are utterly incapable of functioning on
their own, thereby necessitating a legal regime where the
community itself manages the affairs of the victim.125
Helman and Ratner recommend conservatorship as the theoretical
paradigm for assistance of the United Nations in dealing with failed
states.126 Helman and Ratner, as well as Richard Caplan, argued that it
might be necessary to establish a trusteeship under the United Nations
in extreme cases of state failure.127 These scholars would propose that
the states in question “voluntarily relinquish control.”128 This is a
difficult but not impossible task if there is political will on all sides.
Stephen Krasner notes that to improve the well-being of the domestic
population, and decrease the threat to the international community,
alternative options such as de facto trusteeships should be
considered.129 Krasner advances the notion of shared sovereignty
involving the participation of external actors to assist with failed state
reconstruction and a view shared by this article.130 In South Sudan, the
government has limited structural competency to govern themselves.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Since succession, the people of South Sudan have been waiting
for an elusive peace that simply has not emerged. Various border wars
with Sudan, internal conflicts, and human rights abuses against the
civilian population (in particular gender-based violence) has
dampened the enthusiasm that was present during the referendum. The
secession from Sudan was a long a painful struggle, and somewhat
unfairly, South Sudan given recognition as a member of the
international community under the most difficult of circumstances,

125. Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, 89 FOREIGN POL’Y 12
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with few resources and a seemingly impossible mission of rebuilding
from almost nothing.
It is for these reasons that some form of de facto trusteeship or
shared sovereignty is needed. Although not a panacea to resolve every
issue evident in the reconstruction of South Sudan, this should have
been implemented by the international community as a means to assist
them in building a truly functional state. Unfortunately, the debate
surrounding the legal, moral, and practical implications of such large
state-building mechanisms did not take place.
Trusteeship reflects both the severity of the predicament and the
challenge confronting policymakers and scholars regarding the newest
troubled state. It may be for these reasons that scholars today are
looking at trusteeship as a possibly more comprehensive and durable
solution for South Sudan.
Non-governmental organizations and informal groups cannot
replace South Sudan’s lack of a strong federal government and viable
federal structure. Given that the present government of South Sudan
cannot hold the new country together, international intervention of
some sort is imperative. The future could be catastrophic for the
millions of South Sudanese on the brink of famine. This, coupled with
inter-ethnic violence and a low intensity conflict with Sudan, could
quickly threaten South Sudan’s experiment in nationhood.
State failure presents a multitude of challenges for the
international community, and is linked not only to civil wars and other
serious conflicts, but also to poverty, famine, and other social disasters.
Given the complex nature of South Sudan and the resultant
instabilities, it may arguably be in its people’s best interest for the
international community to retain a high degree of shared sovereignty,
in order to address the many issues affecting the state’s structural
competency deficit.
Much has changed since the days of the Westphalian concept of
statehood. With the emergence of regional and international law—
especially human rights law—the notion of state sovereignty has been
challenged. States have a responsibility to protect their citizens and
ensure that human rights law is followed. Various international law
treaties undoubtedly chart the important responsibilities that states
have in respecting international law conventions and in providing
security for their constituents.
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States are not by nature failures, or even doomed to fail. It is
important to recognize that state formation requires a belief in the state.
The situation in South Sudan did not happen by chance, as historical
and geographical circumstances are contributing factors; but it is
largely the result of autocratic leaders, who contribute to and aggravate
state failure. Even as talks between the rebels and the South Sudan
government take place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in early 2014, rival
parties struggle for power with little interest in finding a solution to the
violence and human misery that has afflicted their people.
Prevention and reconstruction of South Sudan are two of the most
important challenges facing the international system, which
undoubtedly require substantial political will and resources in order to
establish the structural competencies of the newest UN Member State.
A United Nations authorized shared sovereignty agreement (possibly
entailing a trusteeship), under a new international law architecture is
needed in order to build the rule of law; economic and social
reconstruction; involvement of civil society, especially by bringing
women and minority groups into the process; establish security; and
disarm this post-conflict state. A trusteeship for South Sudan will
require political will and resources from the international community.
However, this may be the only viable solution to the challenges facing
this troubled nation and region.
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